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Abstract 
 
This article discusses the revival of comparative law in Hungarian Socialist jurisprudence. 
Prior to World War II, the development of comparative law generally had followed 
international trends; however, it was disrupted at both a personal and an institutional level at 
the end of the 1940s due to the Marxist-Leninist turn of legal thinking that accompanied the 
introduction of a Communist regime in the country. Nonetheless, this rejection of comparative 
law was gradually replaced by a more open attitude that strongly supported participation in 
the international comparative-law movement from the 1960s. Imre Szabó and Gyula Eörsi 
played a prominent role in this transformation. They legitimized the use of comparative 
methods in socialist jurisprudence and, also, created a plausible conceptual framework for 
Socialist comparative law.  
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1. Introduction: Hungarian Comparative Law in the First Half of the Twentieth 
Century 
 
Comparative law has played a role in Hungarian jurisprudence since the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law, for instance, already was translated 
into Hungarian by Ágost Pulszky in 1875.1 Pulszky also wrote a lengthy commentary on 
Maine’s work in which—having overviewed the relevant English, French, and German 
literature—he provided a detailed explanation of both English legal concepts and recent 
academic developments for Hungarian readers.  
The 1900 Parisian International Congress of Comparative Law fundamentally transformed 
comparative law. There, Édouard Lambert and Raymond Saleilles had suggested that 
comparative-law thinking had to focus on the laws of so-called ‘civilized nations’ as well as 
on private-law problems instead of producing a comprehensive historical study—as had been 
carried out by Maine or Josef Kohler.
2
 As a consequence, Hungarian comparatists also 
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changed the scope of their research from historical problems to questions of comparative civil 
law. The leading scholar of this era was unquestionably István (Étienne) Szászy. He published 
widely in several foreign languages throughout his career
3
 he also worked together with 
Lambert as an arbitrator in Egypt at the end of the 1940s.
4
 However, World War II and the 
resulting political transformation dramatically changed the direction of this development. 
 
2. The Establishment of Modern Comparative Law in the Socialist Hungary  
 
The Hungarian Workers’ Party, (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja) led by Mátyás Rákosi, seized all 
political power in 1949. This comprehensive change was symbolically crowned by the 
enactment of a new constitution in the same year.
5
 This, however, marked not just the 
beginning of a new era in Hungarian politics but, also, seriously affected other spheres of life. 
In the field of legal and political theory, Socialist professors began concentrating on the 
establishment of a true Marxist legal theory in conjunction with leading an ideological fight 
against the emblematic authors of the earlier non-Socialist era.
6
 This ideological fight was 
fraught with theoretical—though also frequently personal—debates that were devoted to the 
creation of an official, authoritative Marxist-Leninist legal and state theory and to proving the 
superiority of this new approach.  
This intellectual atmosphere was not favorable to the continuation of earlier initiatives in 
the field of comparative law, and the new political regime also took steps to put an end to the 
study of comparative law in Hungary. For example, the Comparative Law and International 
Private Law Department—which had been created in 1945 as part of the Law Faculty at the 
University of Budapest—was closed down in 19517 and the department head, the 
internationally known comparatist, Szászy, was forced to retire in 1950.8 
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Consequently, at the start of the 1950s, the former tradition of comparative law—as 
established by István Szászy and Miklós Ujlaki9—was disrupted at both the institutional and 
the personal level. It appeared that the newly emerging people’s democracy did not need 
comparative law at all. The general scholarly interest in foreign law was being satisfied by 
annotations and review articles about Soviet law, and the academic interest in comparative 
law simply disappeared from the developing Marxist-Leninist legal literature.
10
 
 
2.1. Peaceful Coexistence and Legal Propaganda: The Socialist Legitimization of 
Comparative Law 
 
Following the first ten years of Socialism, the strict rejection of comparative law in the 
Eastern Bloc began to gradually diminish.
11
 The first sign of this process was the 
establishment in 1955 of the Belgrade Institute of Comparative Law in Yugoslavia under the 
leadership of the rector of Belgrade University, Borislav T. Blagojevic.
12
 The main task of 
this institute was to collect data and information about foreign law, as well as to carry out 
comparative research on various fields of law. It also published monographs of a comparative 
nature dedicated to special legal problems as well as Serbian and international legal 
journals.
13
 In addition, Marxist scholars also began publishing articles discussing the Marxist 
perspectives of comparative law and examining opportunities for carrying out independent 
scholarship on Socialist comparative law at the beginning of the 1960s.
14
 In general, these 
papers set forth a prejudiced (from the point of view that they declared the superiority of 
Socialist legal institutions over Western institutions) form of comparative law, and their 
authors also hoped that the use of a comparative method would lead to the partial convergence 
of Socialist legal systems in the future.
15
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As a result, a rather limited debate about the possible roles of comparative law emerged in 
the Socialist bloc during the 1960s, and articles by Hungarian scholars—Imre Szabó and 
Gyula Eörsi—were published in this intellectual environment. One should note from the 
outset, however, that these papers represented a rather different approach compared to the 
general Eastern one that comprehensively rejected the Western—the so-called bourgeois in 
Socialist terms—heritage of comparative-law thinking. These scholarly papers and their 
positive attitude toward comparative law—which even encouraged active participation in 
international initiatives of a comparative-law nature—played a prominent role in changing the 
Socialist Bloc’s attitude to the field of comparative law.16  
Szabó and Eörsi tried to legitimize the application of comparative methods and the 
participation of Hungarian scholars in international academic life in a variety of ways. This 
legitimization was necessary since they were attempting to integrate into Hungarian academic 
life a field of study that had strong and manifest Western roots—in addition to being 
positioned very far from the closed and ideologically determined Marxist-Leninist idea of 
scholarship. 
As a starting point, Szabó and Eörsi emphasized that comparative law could fruitfully be 
used for Socialist legal propaganda.
17
 In 1962, Eörsi pointed out that Western academic public 
opinion shared many “primitive prejudices” about Socialist law that were ridiculous in the 
eyes of Socialist lawyers.
18
 In addition, he also argued that these unfavorable theses had to be 
dispelled by means of intensive foreign academic activity. He gave comparative law a 
prominent role in this respect since Marxist lawyers were able to use international congresses 
on comparative law as a forum to question these prejudices and to contribute to the formation 
of a more precise Western picture of Socialist law. Eörsi argued that the atmosphere of such 
congresses was favorable for debates that started from different ideological positions, and that 
Socialist lawyers were politely welcomed at these events without enduring any undue 
provocation.
19
 Subsequently, international forums on comparative law became exceptionally 
efficient events for the promotion of Socialist legal propaganda. In addition, the participants 
did not have to accept any common theoretical bases in order to take part in the debates at 
such forums; thus, they did not have to set aside their main Marxist principles in order to 
attend and participate.
20
 
In addition to serving propagandistic purposes, however, there was another reason for 
legitimizing Socialist comparative law. This was the very popular idea of peaceful 
coexistence. This term appeared in world politics in the second half of the 1960s and stemmed 
from the certainty that neither of the two main blocs—the West and the East—would 
disappear in the near future. Therefore, it became an accepted fact that it was necessary for 
the two blocs to find a way to coexist and to start a dialogue. This idea of peaceful 
coexistence had many dimensions, including in the area of jurisprudence. The fact that 
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comparative law was given a prominent place in this process was natural from the point of 
view of legal scholarship.  
In Szabó’s eyes, one could study the economic and commercial relations of various 
countries or the rules regulating cultural cooperation from a comparative perspective in order 
to achieve the goal of peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, in-depth research or even the 
comparison of legal systems that are based on different social systems could be justified in the 
name of peaceful coexistence; according to Szabó, this could lead to comparative research on 
democratic institutions.
21
 It is clear that, during the second half of the 1960s, the goal of 
peaceful coexistence opened numerous new channels for legal studies, mostly in the area of 
comparative law; it also is clear that this would have been hardly imaginable during the 
preceding fifteen years due to the ongoing ideological fight between the Eastern and Western 
Blocs. 
There was only one limitation for Socialist lawyers that never could be overlooked while 
conducting research or engaging in cooperation dedicated to peaceful coexistence: the limit of 
ideological consistency. Szabó formulated this as follows: “in theoretical questions, Socialist 
jurisprudence cannot give up its theoretical-scientific position”.22 That is, Socialist lawyers 
never were able to withdraw from their theses the ideal essence of Socialist law and, 
consequently, always had to be devoted to these ideas in their research. It also was a 
consequence of the limit of ideological consistency that peaceful coexistence did not imply 
the slow convergence—or a possible synthesis—of legal systems related to different social 
systems; rather, it only meant peaceful competition among scholars representing different 
conceptual bases.
23
 
So, argued Szabó, theoretical Marxist positions could not be given up in international 
dialogue. As for the scholarly attitudes of Szabó and Eörsi, it also should be mentioned that 
they both applied not only the vocabulary but, also, the entire conceptual framework of 
Marxism. They maintained classical positions, e.g., that the economic setting determines all 
other relationships in a given era—including the features of legal systems—or that the 
Socialist social system was a qualitatively new form of social organization. In this sense, their 
frequent references to Marxist bases reflected well-founded beliefs. However, it would be 
unjust to label them as simple epigones of Marx or Engels, as many scholars from the Eastern 
Bloc indeed were. Instead, they made intense efforts to establish independent Socialist 
scholarship of comparative law. Although their approach to comparative law was clearly and 
devotedly a Marxist one, they did try to escape the shortcomings of a purely ideological 
doctrine.  
In conclusion, both the goal of legal propaganda and the principle of peaceful coexistence 
guaranteed the starting points—in Hungarian jurisprudence of the 1960s—on which an 
efficient argument about the justification and utility of comparative law could have been 
based. Szabó and Eörsi, as important figures in the field of Hungarian comparative law and 
general academic life in this era, exploited this opportunity and opened a new and 
internationally recognized phase in the development of Hungarian comparative law.  
 
3. Conceptual Bases of Socialist Comparative Law 
 
3.1. The Critique of the ‘Bourgeois’ Approach 
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The practical legitimization of comparative law was not enough to completely restart 
comparative legal studies. To do this, a coherent conceptual framework also was needed; a 
framework that, on the one hand, differed greatly from the Western approach to comparative 
law and that, on the other hand, could be accepted by Western scholars as a real starting point 
for scholarly discussions. Accordingly, this future theory of Socialist comparative law could 
not be simply based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, since it would have been easily 
discredited as unscientific in the eyes of Western comparatists. At the same time, it had to 
remain openly Marxist in order preserve a semblance of being different from the Western line 
of thought. 
Therefore, the task for these authors was not simply to establish a Socialist framework for 
a Socialist form of comparative law. In addition, they had to gain comprehensive knowledge 
of comparative law itself, since the Western conception of comparative law could only be 
rebutted in this way, at least from a scholarly point of view. Therefore, the conceptual bases 
would have to be created from two directions simultaneously. First, the history of 
comparative law had to be understood and re-evaluated from a Marxist perspective. Then, 
second, the starting points of a theory of Socialist comparative law had to be established with 
special regard to the problem of the comparability of legal systems that have different socio-
economic backgrounds.  
The classic Marxist thesis—that the development of social science is fundamentally 
dependent on socio-economic relations—offered an excellent starting point for the discovery 
of general laws behind the history of comparative law.
24
 On the basis of this approach, it was 
almost certain to connect the structure of the world economy prior to World War I—in 
Marxist terms: monopolistic capitalism and the existence of a dynamic and comprehensive 
world trade—with the boom in comparative law that happened in the same period. It seemed 
to be evident from a Marxist perspective that modern comparative law was created by both 
the emergence of a ‘bourgeois world market’ and the practical claims of swiftly developing 
world trade. The knowledge of foreign law, therefore, became indispensable for the various 
international transactions that were occurring. In addition, the process through which 
monopolistic capitalism gradually acquired a cosmopolitan, supranational nature also 
suggested the unification of divergent national legal provisions and the transplantation of 
given legal institutions in order to enhance the efficiency of general exploitation.
25
 All in all, 
Marxist scholars argued, behind the impressive emergence of comparative law in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, one could find the interests of monopolistic capitalism and the 
world market, Moreover, the successes of comparative law could be recognized as 
repercussions of this economic process.  
This inherently socio-economic approach—emphasizing the role of economic factors—
was refined by the acknowledgment of the fact that the general tendencies of the development 
of social science in the nineteenth century also stimulated the emergence of comparative law. 
In this regard, Szabó first stressed the gradual spread of the comparative method in general 
scientific thinking and, also, pointed out the importance of the use of the historical method 
stemming from the idea of evolution.
26
 As a result, he took a view of the emergence of 
comparative law as a distinct field of legal studies that was not exclusively economic since, 
besides the basic causes of economic development, he also connected the dynamic 
development of comparative law to the general tendencies of the history of ideas. 
It is clear that both Szabó and Eörsi regarded comparative law as a scientific movement, 
the successes of which were related to the transformation of nineteenth-century capitalism in a 
monopolistic and international direction. Furthermore, they also suggested that the 
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comparative-law movement evidently served the interests of those Western countries that had 
a leading role in the world trade of this era. In conclusion, Szabó and Eörsi asserted that 
comparative law had been a tool of bourgeois jurisprudence up until the 1960s. However, they 
felt that a coherent critique of this bourgeois approach could lead to the conclusion that the 
jurisprudence and legal scholarship of Socialist countries, based on fundamentally different 
socio-economic conditions, could also successfully apply a comparative method.
27
  
3.2. External and Internal Comparative Law 
 
There was another step that was indispensable to the successful completion of comparative-
law-related research following the historical critique of the prevailing Western conception. 
This required a conceptual framework in which legal systems based on both similar and 
different socio-economic backgrounds could be compared without major difficulties. In 
addition, research on Western legal systems could not revert to the formulation of 
ideologically based prejudices as had occurred during the era when comparative law had been 
generally rejected by the Socialist Bloc. If Socialist comparative law could not meet these 
criteria, it would be stuck at the level of narrow provincialism, i.e., the eventual comparison 
of the legal systems of the Socialist Bloc. Needless to say, this would have drastically 
decreased opportunities for a potential dialogue with the comparatists of the Western world. 
For Szabó, the starting point for solving this problem was the concept of law type 
developed by Marxist-Leninist jurisprudence. This concept united those legal systems that 
were based on the same socio-economic background; thus, legal systems belonging to 
different socio-economic systems could be delimited on this basis.
28
 For instance, the 
bourgeois and Socialist law types could easily be contrasted since both were based on 
fundamentally different socio-economic backgrounds: the bourgeois one on private property; 
conversely, the Socialist one on the societal ownership of the means of production. Subgroups 
based on various secondary features could even exist within a given legal type. Szabó called 
these law system-forms.
29
 The most significant achievement of this concept was that it made 
it possible to differentiate between the essential features of legal systems (the socio-economic 
background) and secondary features (legal techniques). Law types were created on the basis 
of essential features, while law system-forms were established on the basis of secondary 
characteristics.  
Upon successfully making a plausible distinction between the two important law types—
the Bourgeois and Socialist—one could also find an answer to the question of how this insight 
could be applied to Socialist comparative law. According to Szabó, by using the law type as a 
conceptual starting point, the two main areas of comparative law could be identified: the 
comparison of legal systems belonging to the same law type and that of legal systems 
pertaining to different types. Szabó called the first ‘internal comparative law’30 and argued 
that comparatists could consistently reach conclusions on the similarities since there were no 
essential differences among legal systems within the same type.
31
 The second area was called 
‘external comparative law’,32 which involved the comparison of legal systems with different 
socio-economic backgrounds, i.e., a detailed study of bourgeois and Socialist laws, two 
contrasting systems from both a historical and logical point of view. Szabó suggested that the 
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Socialist law type was at a higher level of legal development; it had surpassed the bourgeois 
law type from a historical perspective. Moreover, Szabó asserted that there also was a logical 
contrast between the two since the Socialist system was determined by the relations of 
production—which were based on social property—contrary to the bourgeois legal systems, 
which were based on the concept of private property.
33
 Evidently, a comparison would lead to 
the recognition and stressing of differences in comparative law.  
Taken together, internal and external comparative law formed so-called ‘general 
comparative law’. The most important feature of general comparative law was that it 
involved, in essence, a comparison of the legal systems inside and outside of the Socialist 
Bloc.
34
 Furthermore, it is also relevant that—even though he stressed the methodological 
differences between internal and external comparative law—Szabó’s arguments never created 
an ideological differentiation that would impede real research by being unscientific in nature. 
Thus, by separating internal and external comparative law on the basis of legal types, Szabó 
created a coherent theoretical background for Socialist comparative law that was a plausible 
alternative in the eyes of Western comparatists and, also, similarly saved Socialist 
comparative law from ideological and dogmatic paralysis. His theory seemed to be a scientific 
and non-vulgarized Marxist one in Hungary; however, it could also be accepted in the 
Western world, as it did not seem to be ideologically overloaded and therefore simplistic.
35
 
By focusing on the concept of the law type and by equating the significance of internal and 
external comparative law, Szabó found that narrow path that made it possible to meet the 
expectations of Hungarian and Western academic and political life. Needless to say, it was a 
difficult task since most of these explicit and implicit expectations were contrary to one 
another.
36
 It is very likely that this was one of the main reasons that Szabó was accepted as an 
equal academic partner in the Western world.
37
 
 
3.3. Perspectives of Comparative Civil Law 
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established his theory on the concept of law type. Szabó could not agree with the use of the concept of legal 
families since it was not based on the determining nature of the economy; thus, it did not suit the Marxist 
approach. See Imre Szabó, “Egy összehasonlító jogi munkáról”, 8(2) Állam- és Jogtudomány (1965), 243-249. 
35
 Szabó’s concept of comparative law was first published in French in 1964 and also was published later in 
English. Thus, his oeuvre was accessible in Western languages beginning in the second half of the 1960s. See 
Imre Szabó, “La science comparative du droit”, 6 Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando 
Eötvös Nominate - Sectio Iuridica (1964), 91-134; and id., “Theoretical Questions of Comparative Law”, in Imre 
Szabó and Zoltán Péteri (eds.), A Socialist Approach to Comparative Law (A.W. Sijthoff and Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Leiden and Budapest, 1977), 9-44. Book reviews about the latter volume emphasized Szabó’s chapter, including 
a detailed discussion of, and commentary on, the content. See John N. Hazard, “Book review”, 3(4) Review of 
Socialist Law (1977), 500-508; Jorge L. Carro, “Book appraisal”, 70(3) Law Library Journal (1977), 391-392; 
and Marc Ancel, “Compte rendu”, 30(2) Revue internationale de droit comparé (1978), 923-925. 
36
 Academics in the Socialist Bloc always had to prove their Marxist-Leninist commitment and the perceived 
superiority of their way of thinking in international academic life because of the internal logic of Marxist 
thinking. This did not facilitate the formation of a fruitful dialogue with Western scholarship in the social 
sciences since Western academics envisaged the social sciences as more or less value-free fields of study. Thus, 
the two approaches were qualitatively different, and, therefore, Socialist academics had to make considerable 
intellectual efforts to join Western academic life.  
37
 This point can be illustrated by Szabó’s international appearances. He was the chair of a panel at the 
Centennial Conference of the Société de legislation comparée that discussed the comparison of legal orders from 
different socio-economic backgrounds in 1969 in Paris. He wrote a chapter about Socialist law in a volume 
discussing the various concepts of law in the world in a series of the International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law. He was a professor at the Faculté internationale de droit comparé in Strasbourg and was nominated as 
president of the Académie internationale de droit comparé for four years (1978-1982) at the tenth International 
Comparative Law Congress in Budapest. 
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In addition to Szabó’s research, comparative-law problems also appeared in the oeuvre of 
Gyula (Iulius) Eörsi, who was a leading figure in Hungarian private-law studies in the same 
era. Contrary to Szabó, Eörsi started to discuss certain questions of comparative law in the 
framework of private law; but his insights had a much more comprehensive outlook than an 
ordinary comparison of private-law institutions. Dealing with private-law comparison, Eörsi 
also formulated several conclusions with a broad conceptual relevance. His earlier work had 
already shown that a discussion of foreign law was never an exotic element in his academic 
thinking,
38
 but he consciously began to apply a comparative method during the 1960s. 
 
3.3.1. First Attempts 
 
A symbolic first attempt at comparative private law was Eörsi’s school textbook published in 
1950 in Szeged.
39
 Its aim was to offer the reader a comparative presentation of Western 
private-law institutions: principles, personal rights, forms of legal personality, property, and 
shares were discussed in detail. Through this comparative analysis, Eörsi attempted to reveal 
both the mechanisms of exploitation in the very nature of capitalism and the class dependence 
of private law.
40
 
Although the ideological nature of his coursebook is self-evident—and because of this, one 
could regard it as a means of internal legal propaganda on behalf of Socialism rather than as a 
work with real academic value—two elements should be emphasized. First, despite all its 
ideological features, it can clearly be seen that the author was not unfamiliar with the basics of 
Western comparative law, as he provides a criticism of the theses of Lambert and Saleilles.
41
 
Second, this work also provides an important insight into the question of how his thinking 
about comparative law evolved, since one can find many ideas in an embryonic form in the 
book that would only be explained in more detail in his later publications. The connection 
between the development of comparative law and the claims of nineteenth-century capitalism, 
for example, and his taxonomy of Western private laws on the basis of the capitalist 
transformation, first appeared in this textbook.
42
  
At the beginning of the 1960s, Eörsi published novel articles dedicated to special questions 
of comparative law. His article about the prohibition of torts is of special significance. This 
paper could indeed be regarded as the first real achievement of Socialist comparative civil law 
in Hungary. In this longer piece, Eörsi presented opportunities for the comparative method in 
Socialist jurisprudence. He demonstrated the usefulness of comparative law
43
 by engaging in 
comparative research on two qualitatively different levels. He first compared the various rules 
related to torts in French, Swiss, English, German, and Austrian law—emphasis should be 
placed on the fact that Eörsi not only analyzed the pure legal rules but, also, examined the 
relevant case law in detail—and then he also studied the Hungarian and Soviet provisions. In 
both cases, he provided certain theses about the main features of these regulations on a 
                                                          
38
 Eörsi’s first volume was published in 1947 when he was 25 years old. Dedicated to the problems of the 
transfer of ownership, he referred explicitly to the Code Civil, the Sale of Goods Act, and certain sections of the 
Swiss Law of Obligations, while also citing relevant foreign literature. See Gyula Eörsi, “A tulajdonátszállás 
kérdéséről”, in Tamás Sárközy and Vékás Lajos (eds.), Eörsi Gyula emlékkönyv (HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2002) 
292-299. 
39
 Gyula Eörsi, Összehasonlító magánjog (V.K.M. III. sz. Jegyzetkészítı Iroda, Szeged, 1950). 
40
 Ibid., 3. 
41
 Ibid., 3. 
42
 Ibid., 2 and 4-8. 
43
 Gyula Eörsi, “A károkozás tilalma és megengedettsége a szocialista és burzsoá jogban” 5(2) Állam- és 
Jogtudomány (1962), 287-313, at 287. 
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comparative basis, and compared these general theses and formulated conclusions about the 
reasons for the differences between Western and Soviet tort law.  
The article provided a rather nuanced picture of comparative law compared to his textbook 
of 1950. It was refined and well conceptualized and, also, provided an adequate picture of the 
perspectives that a comparative method could offer to Socialist comparative civil law. 
 
3.3.2. The Marxist Approach to the Classification of Legal Systems 
 
The original version of Eörsi’s monumental work on comparative civil law was published in 
1975. His treatise—which ran to more than 600 pages—provided a detailed explanation of his 
view of comparative law in general and of comparative civil law in particular.
44
 The most 
important parts concerning general questions of comparative law were the chapters in which 
he discussed the problem of classifying the world’s legal systems. Eörsi criticized the 
prevailing Western approaches to taxonomy from a Marxist point of view and suggested a 
different approach stemming from Marxist premises. As a result, Eörsi’s conception took 
shape from a deep and passionate debate with ‘bourgeois’ scholars and their theories and 
offered a conceptually well-founded Marxist alternative to the classification proposals of his 
time. Moreover, Eörsi committed himself to certain important points in one of the essential 
questions of post-World War II comparative law.  
As a starting point, while recognizing that the approaches of David and Zweigert
45
 were 
not inadequate, Eörsi also stressed that both suffered from two important deficiencies. The 
first was that the Western authors’ classification was a philosophical one since certain 
deficiencies could be traced back to the limited nature of their conceptual bases. While 
discussing the Western attempts at classification, Eörsi unambiguously pointed out that he 
could not accept approaches of jurisprudence that delimited the phenomenon of law from 
social processes.
46
 In Eörsi’s view, law was not just a collection of norms but, rather, a social 
phenomenon; therefore, for Eörsi, jurisprudence could not exist purely as a theory of norms. 
Instead, Eörsi argued that jurisprudence should be a field of social science that is capable of 
interpreting and integrating into the framework of general studies on law those phenomena 
that affect law from outside, e.g., the economy, social processes, or even history.
47
 Hence, 
Marxist jurisprudence—regarded as a social science that is able to deal with law as an 
essentially social phenomenon—would necessarily arrive at different conclusions about the 
classification of the world’s legal systems in comparison with the leading Western 
scholarship.  
According to Eörsi, the second problem of Western classificatory attempts—this was 
partially related to the first deficiency—was that they were unable to reach those fundamental 
factors that determine the main features of legal systems. They simply stopped at research into 
secondary or other factors instead of conducting an in-depth study of the essential questions, 
i.e., a discussion of the effect of society and the economy on legal development.
48
 Eörsi 
suggested that Western authors were generally satisfied with the study of intellectual and 
                                                          
44
 Gyula Eörsi, Összehasonlító polgári jog (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1975); and id., Comparative Civil Law 
(Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1979).  
45
 Essentially, both authors tried to classify the world’s legal systems on the basis of legal (e.g., unique features 
of legal thinking, special legal institutions, and peculiarities of legal development) and ideological (e.g., the 
nature of the social system, the characteristics of the dominant ideology, and the role of law in social relations) 
features. However, they almost completely ignored economic phenomena. See René David, Traité élémentaire 
de droit civil comparé (LGDJ, Paris, 1950), 214-224; and Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Einführung in die 
Rechtsvergleichung. Band I: Grundlagen (J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1971), 67-80. 
46
 Eörsi, Comparative Civil Law, op.cit. note 44, 44 and 46. 
47
 Ibid. 47. 
48
 Ibid., 46. 
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institutional dimensions of law and, therefore, essentially disregarded economic phenomena 
altogether. They simply neglected the totality of the economy and society. This extensive 
negligence of economic factors made a real classification of legal systems that is based on 
economic and social factors impossible, argued Eörsi from a Marxist point of view. 
Eörsi concludes that Western classificatory attempts were basically unable to recognize the 
importance of economic and social relationships—with special regard to the significance of 
property and its consequences—that essentially determine the phenomenon of law. They were 
therefore based on secondary factors instead of real causes.
49
 Both the ‘style elements’ 
(Stilelemente) of Zweigert
50
 and the legal-family conception of David came from some kind 
of intellectual eclecticism; thus, they were unable to grasp the main engine of legal 
development: the transformation of the forces of production. According to Eörsi, they 
necessarily offered an incomplete view of the world’s legal systems.  
Eörsi based his conception on two different units similar to those of Szabó. He made a 
distinction between law types and law groups. A law type was a high-level abstraction that 
expressed the legal peculiarities of a given economic system, while a law group reflected the 
particularities of individual legal development at a lower level of abstraction. A law type 
grasped law at a high level of abstraction and in a comprehensive manner, e.g., focusing on 
the following questions: which social class owns the means of production, which form of 
ownership is dominant, and to which kind of production and organization system is this 
related?
51
 Conversely, a law group was a collection of legal systems of a given law type that 
shared common secondary factors.
52
 
Eörsi classified the legal systems of the Western world by analyzing the features of 
capitalist transformation. Within the Socialist law type, he also created two law groups on the 
basis of pre-revolutionary economic traditions.
53
 In conclusion, Eörsi classified the legal 
systems of his era into two law types and various law groups: 
 
I. Socialist law type: 
1. European Socialist law group; and 
2. Far Eastern Socialist law group. 
II. Bourgeois law type: 
1. The legal group of the early bourgeois transformation (English and Nordic laws); 
2. The legal group of the consistent bourgeois transformation (French and Swiss laws, and 
those legal systems that followed the English, French, and Austrian models); and 
3. The legal group of delayed bourgeois transformation (the Prussian, Austrian, and 
German laws). 
 
It is clear that, while Eörsi’s approach was based on a systematic Marxist critique of Western 
authors, it was also qualitatively different. Emphasis should also be placed on the fact that, 
even though there are certain points in this concept that are obviously different from Western 
approaches, they have numerous common characteristics. For example, Eörsi’s classification 
is exclusively based on private law; it focused on the legal systems of the era, i.e., it did not 
deal with ancient systems; it mostly dealt with European and North American legal systems, 
and it also relied on a multi-level classification, dividing legal systems into major families and 
                                                          
49
 Ibid., 42-46. 
50
 Zweigert and Kötz, op.cit. note 45, 72-79.  
51
 Eörsi, op.cit. note 44, 49-52. 
52
 Ibid, 100-106. 
53
 Ibid., 203-204. 
 12 
various sub-groups.
54
 As a result, one could say that, while Eörsi’s classification was clearly 
Marxist in nature, it was consistent with the comparative law of his time. Moreover, his 
approach contributed many insights that led to a better understanding of the comparative-law 
problems of the era.
55
  
 
4. The Effect of Szabó and Eörsi 
 
The works of Szabó and Eörsi made it possible to carry out comparative-law research in 
Hungary following a break of more than ten years. Due to their overwhelming success and 
reputation abroad, the utility of comparative law was no longer in doubt. At the Legal Institute 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, a department of comparative law was created in the 
1960s.
56
 In addition to organizing work on documentation,
57
 it also organized and coordinated 
Hungarian participation in international congresses of comparative law which were held every 
four years. Furthermore, the department also ensured the publication of the Hungarian 
national reports in foreign languages in cooperation with the publishing house of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Akadémiai Kiadó).58 In addition, the application of a 
comparative method gradually became more important in all aspects of academic legal 
thinking in Hungary. This could be seen in the form of presentations of foreign legal solutions 
or in the application of a historical-comparative approach.
59
 
Instead of disappearing from Hungarian legal thinking because of the unfavorable events 
of the 1950s, comparative law, in fact, lived on during the following decades of Socialism due 
to these two well-known Marxist scholars. Their work also ensured that Hungarian 
comparative law did not restart from a vacuum following the political transition of 1989. 
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“The System of Legal System: Notes on a Problem of Classification in Comparative Law”, 13 Scandinavian 
Studies in Law (1969), 129-149. 
55
 Constantinesco, in his book dedicated to the problems of classification, analyzes and criticizes Eörsi’s concept, 
and even though he had a very critical attitude toward Socialist comparative law (for instance, he refers to Szabó 
as a simple epigone of Marx), he recognized the scientific and polemic value of Eörsi’s work. See 
Constantinesco, op.cit. note 7, 145. The book reviews dedicated to Eörsi’s [please make clear who it is to whom 
you are referring here when you write ‘his’, presumably Eörsi] work unambiguously praise it. See, André Tunc, 
“Compte rendu”, 32(2) Revue internationale de droit comparé (1980), 468-471; and Peter B. Maggs, “Book 
review”, 8(4) International Journal of Law Libraries (1980), 178-179. [] 
56
 For more on the creation and the early years of the Department of Comparative Law, see Zoltán Péteri, “A 
jogösszehasonlítás kelet-közép-európai centruma”, 51(1) Állam- és Jogtudomány (2010), 71-80. [This is a 
minor point; but nevertheless not unimportant: are these all of the book reviews dedicated to his (again 
presumably Eörsi’s) work?  Or are these ones which you have selected as being among the most 
representative?] Thanks for mentioning it, I only know these book reviews, so I deleted “for example” 
(even there might be other ones in the European literature). 
57
 For example, the Department of Comparative Law published the Hungarian translations of the Socialist 
constitutions. See Attila Rácz (ed.), Új szocialista alkotmányok (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Intézete Jogösszehasonlító Osztálya, Budapest, 1966).  
58
 See the volumes comprising the Hungarian national reports submitted to the international congresses of 
comparative law published every four years: Studies in Jurisprudence for the 6th International Congress of 
Comparative Law (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1962); Zoltán Péteri (ed.), Études en droit comparé/Essays in 
Comparative Law (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1966); id. (ed.), Hungarian Law–Comparative Law/Droit 
hongrois–droit comparé (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1970); id. (ed.), The Comparison of Law/La comparaison 
de droit (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1974); Imre Szabó and Zoltán Péteri (eds.), Comparative Law/Droit 
comparé (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1978); Zoltán Péteri and Vanda Lamm (eds.), Legal Development and 
Comparative Law/Évolution du droit et droit comparé (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1982); and id. (eds.), Legal 
Development and Comparative Law/Évolution du droit et droit comparé (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1986). 
59
 For a general discussion, see Csaba Varga, “A szocializmus marxizmusának jogelmélete”, 54(4) Világosság 
(2004), 89-116, at 96. A monograph by Varga can be mentioned as an example, as it discusses the phenomenon 
of codification in a preeminently historical-comparative context. Csaba Varga, A kodifikáció mint társadalmi-
történelmi jelenség (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1979).  
 13 
Instead, Hungarian comparative law was able to draw on the academic and institutional 
heritage of an earlier era, even though Marxism—as a comprehensive scientific basis—had 
more or less been rejected in recent jurisprudence.   
 
 
 
